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MR. CRAGG:  My name is Michael Cragg.  I’m a 
Principal at The Brattle Group.  Thank you for coming 
and joining us this afternoon for a discussion of the 
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On the panel there are two economists, 
myself and David Evans.  David has been very involved 
in the economic literature as well as the litigation 
around what has now become the issue of two-sided 
markets.  I think you’ve written on the order of eight 
books and several handfuls worth of articles, many of 
them on this topic.  So we look forward to his 
commentary in particular since it was so highly cited 
in the actual Supreme Court decision. 
MR. EVANS:  I got to sell books. 
MR. CRAGG:  I guess the other point I 
learned as I did a Google search on you is that 
Fordham was where you originally started your career. 
MR. EVANS:  It is.  I taught at Fordham Law 
School for a good ten years back in the old building. 
MR. CRAGG:  Immediately on my right is Barry 
Nigro, who is joining us here today currently from the 
Department of Justice as a Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General.  He was at Fried Frank, for —  
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MR. CRAGG:  You were the head of the firm’s 
antitrust department for a little while.  When he says 
“off and on,” you were at the Federal Trade Commission 
as well. 
MR. NIGRO:  Yes. 
MR. CRAGG:  Presumably you’re not speaking 
on behalf of the government but rather representing 
your own views today. 
MR. NIGRO:  Actually, I think even if I said 
that, I am speaking on behalf of the government, I’m 
told.  That’s an FTC thing. 
MR. CRAGG:  Okay.  We’ll make sure we don’t 
ask you any questions then. 
On my far right is Chul Pak, who is — I 
probably just bastardized your last name, so if I did 
—  
MR. PAK:  No, that’s fine, Pak, yes. 
MR. CRAGG:  I’m doing better than usual. 
Also, Chul is currently at Wilson, Sansini.  
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Barry have known each other for years.  I won’t say 
how, but part of it was from your time heading up the 
Mergers IV group at the FTC.  Since then, you’ve been 
very active I’ve learned in a variety of different 
types of litigations across a variety of both legal 
issues as well as industry.  You previously litigated 
a number of different cases on behalf of the 
government. 
One of the topics that we’ll certainly be 
interested in today will be what the impact of this 
decision will be on litigation going forward. 
MR. PAK:  I can wear a lot of different 
hats, and we’ll figure out which hat I’m going to wear 
today as questions come along. 
MR. CRAGG:  Excellent.  So the format today, 
it’ll be a Q&A.  I’ll be posing questions to the 
panel, generally speaking.  Please feel free to break 
in with your own perspectives. 
Just to get things started, I’m curious: How 
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to be talking about today? 
[Show of hands]  
So about half.   
How many people have actually carefully read 
it? 
[Show of hands] 
MR. NIGRO:  Notice nobody up here raised 
their hand. 
MR. CRAGG:  We didn’t have a lot of close 
reads, and so as you guys are providing your 
commentary I think it’ll be important to provide a lot 
of background, thinking from an educational 
perspective, as to what some of the terminology is 
that we’ll be looking at. 
Barry, if we can just kick things off with 
you, this question in the AMEX decision, the piece 
that is I think particularly important to economists 
and lawyers, is the introduction from a legal 
perspective of a two-sided market.  That was really 
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Could you give us a little perspective on 
what that actually means? 
MR. NIGRO:  One of the things I worry about 
in this area, just like I do with the term “big data,” 
is people use it as though it has implications that it 
is something that needs to be regulated.  I worry that 
people when they say “two-sided market,” all of a 
sudden they mean that it’s something that needs to be 
treated differently.  That may or may not be the case, 
so I think we need to be precise in what we’re talking 
about when we talk about platforms and two-sided 
markets and things of that nature. 
You can have a traditional vertical 
relationship, which is just a relationship between 
products or services at different levels of 
distribution that are not substitutes.  They can be 
one-sided markets; they can be two-sided markets.  I 
think the dissent in American Express said they’re all 
two-sided markets, but they could be one- or two-
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indirect network effects or not, and the indirect 
network effects can flow in one direction or both 
directions. 
All of that is to say when we talk about 
two-sided markets what we’re really trying to do is 
understand the competitive dynamics and the proper way 
to evaluate those dynamics, taking into account the 
commercial realities of the market. 
When I think about a platform, I think about 
a space.  It can be a physical space, like a shopping 
mall, that brings consumers or users from two 
different groups together; it could be a virtual 
space, such as an app.  It’s just something that 
facilitates the interaction among different user 
groups. 
I think whenever we’re talking about two-
sided markets it’s important to be more specific if 
the purpose of the conversation is really to try to 
get to the heart of the competitive dynamics of the 
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Department of Justice is trying to figure out the 
implications of conduct, the implications of mergers. 
MR. CRAGG:  Thanks, Barry.  One of the 
phrases you used, which I think is a very important 
phrase in the decision and one that everyone should 
take note of, is that the distinguishing feature for a 
two-sided market is that it exhibit “indirect network 
effects.”  That’s at least my reading.   
Do the three of you guys agree with that 
interpretation, that that’s the distinguishing 
feature? 
MR. NIGRO:  I would say it’s necessary but 
not sufficient.  But the expert is sitting next to me. 
MR. EVANS:  In the interest of clarifying 
things and getting the terminology right, I think the 
one thing I would discourage people from using too 
quickly — and then I’ll get to the question of 
indirect network effects — is the term “two-sided 
markets” because it quickly leads to confusion. 
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platforms, whether a business is a two-sided platform 
— and, Barry, I think you accurately described the 
characteristics of a basic two-sided platform. 
Then the question for those two-sided 
platforms, whether it’s a shopping mall or whether 
it’s something like open cable connecting restaurants 
and users, the question for those platforms is then, 
who do you compete with?  That then leads to the 
market definition question. 
It could be the case that all of the 
businesses that are relevant competitors are two-sided 
platforms, and if you want to then use the term, 
that’s then in a “two-sided market,” then that’s a 
perfectly fine thing to do. 
But it’s not necessary, when you start with 
an antitrust matter or a merger involving a two-sided 
platform, at least as a matter of economics, that the 
market only include other two-sided platforms.  For 
example, in the case of a shopping mall, yes, it could 
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stores.  In that case, that’s a market.  If that turns 
out to be where you define the market boundaries, that 
could be a market that has two-sided platforms — 
shopping malls — and also traditional retail stores.  
My preference is to refer to two-sided platforms, and 
then that leads to whatever market definition you 
have. 
I would say, getting to the question on 
indirect network effects, that it is almost always the 
case — I could probably say it’s always the case — 
that things we characterize as two-sided platforms 
have indirect network effects that flow at least from 
one side.  So the defining characteristic is there is 
some interdependency between the demand for the two 
types of users. 
The other defining characteristic that is 
mentioned in the AMEX decision which I think we should 
also note is that it is often the case for a two-sided 
platform that the pricing structure — how you balance 
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important aspect of the business reality.  If you 
think about indirect network effects, the importance 
of the price structure, and connectedness between the 
two sides, I think that pretty much covers the gamut. 
MR. CRAGG:  I was wondering if you guys 
could provide a couple of examples where you have an 
interaction between consumers where there are indirect 
network effects.  I think that would be one example 
which would be helpful to the audience.  Then contrast 
it with a similar type of setup but where there isn’t 
a network effect. 
MR. NIGRO:  I’ll take a stab at it.  I’m not 
sure how good an example this is, but one where there 
are network effects, the Court used the example of 
newspapers and advertising to make the point that 
there the network effects flowed in only one 
direction.  The newspaper was more valuable to the 
advertisers and increased in value as the number of 
readers increased. 
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newspaper to the readers does not necessarily increase 
in value if it becomes nothing but a collection of 
advertisements.  There the Court said that functions 
more like a one-sided market because the indirect 
network effects flow in one direction. 
I guess something without network effects 
would be just a traditional retail model where a 
retailer buys a product from a manufacturer, takes 
title to it, and resells it. 
MR. PAK:  I think it’s going to really vary 
— and I think we’re going to deal with this a lot more 
in later discussions, and the economists will be 
incredibly beneficial — but a lot of it will be on the 
impact of the data and the pricing effects to the 
extent you can measure. 
But I think what AMEX was trying to get at 
in distinguishing between the newspapers, for example, 
because it did give that example of the newspapers, 
but in the modern day you’ve got also a number of 
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platforms, where you do have the network effects, 
where the fact that the consumer engages more in that 
platform then creates greater demand from the supply 
side for more providers into that platform, whether 
they’re app developers or advertisers or something 
like that, and it does have that symbiotic component. 
Whether there is going to be a tight 
correlation on price and effect, again that comes back 
to the data, and that will tell you.  But I think, 
directionally speaking, that kind of symbiotic 
relationship is the network effect that does happen a 
lot in technology platforms today. 
MR. EVANS:  The example I love to give on 
indirect network effects is my favorite example, which 
is open cable.  Open cable is a business where 
restaurants value the platform to the extent that 
there are more consumers that are potentially 
interested in the restaurant, and consumers are 
interested in platforms that have more restaurants 
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restaurant when they want to go out to dinner and so 
forth.  That’s an example where there are clear 
indirect network effects flowing between both sides. 
If you take the restaurant itself, you don’t 
really see those kinds of indirect network effects.  
One is a single-sided business — the restaurant — and 
the intermediary that is operating between the 
restaurant and the consumers is an example of a two-
sided platform. 
MR. CRAGG:  Thank you.   
In terms of proving whether there are 
indirect network effects or not, what kind of evidence 
does the case instruct us as being relevant?  What 
kind of evidence can you imagine being put on in 
future cases? 
MR. PAK:  Again, I think the economists are 
incredibly important here.  It seems to me this is the 
kind of thing where a question has been created, and 
the economists will dig into this immensely, and their 
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Certainly in the AMEX decision they were 
able to do a lot more of this robust pricing analysis 
because on the one side, on the supply side, they had 
merchant fees as a data point; and then, on the 
consumer side, AMEX could look to the value of its 
rewards and see if there was this balance that you 
talked about. 
But I could imagine there are a number of 
other platform types — for example, search — where 
that’s going to be a very difficult thing to measure 
because you’ll have fees and whatnot that you’ll 
charge to advertisers.  But how do you quantify and 
measure with consumers, who aren’t paying anything for 
that search?  In other kinds of platforms you have 
similar — even open cable, where consumers come in and 
utilize it without paying anything, but there will be 
fees and whatnot to restaurants. 
MR. NIGRO:  I just have a couple of 
comments.   
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going to be very important, and that is highlighted in 
the decision that came out two days ago in the NCAA 
case, the grant-in-aid cap case with Ken Elzinga.  One 
of the reasons the court gave for not allowing him to 
introduce evidence of a multisided market is that he 
does not examine any economic data at all to quantify, 
test, evaluate, or confirm any of the economic 
relationships upon which his proposed multisided 
relevant market is predicated.  This is maybe the 
first decision since AMEX came out at a trial court 
level.  Economics will be important.   
I think the other thing that is going to be 
important are the “commercial realities,” to use the 
term that the Court used in AMEX.  It talked about 
typically you look at products in a relevant market, 
you look at substitutes, but then it went on to say 
the Court should combine different products and 
services into a single market when that combination 
reflects commercial realities. 
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and you look at the brief that the Department of 
Justice put in, I think where this all comes to a head 
is on market definition.  The Department was happy for 
the Court to take account of the efficiencies or 
network effects — the interdependence on the other 
side of the market, so to speak.  We thought that 
should not be ignored. 
Where we disagreed is that we thought that 
was the job of the defendants in the second step of 
the three-part analysis.  We thought we established 
our prima facie case, and the defendants can come in 
and they can explain why in this two-sided market that 
the conduct that is being challenged is, on balance, 
procompetitive, or at least competitively neutral. 
What the Supreme Court did is they said that 
in order to figure whether something is procompetitive 
or anticompetitive we have to look at it and measure 
something, so then we have to figure out, well, what 
do we measure?  Then they said, “You have to define 
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anticompetitive effect.”  They said we have to define 
the market, so we’re going to define the market to be 
transactions. 
As soon as you define the market to be a 
transactions platform, then you’ve effectively 
collapsed step one and step two in the DOJ test that 
was proffered.  In a sense, the Court ended up taking 
account of some of the same thing that the Department 
thought should be taken account of.   
But we had a different approach.  I think a 
critical question in these cases is, what is it that 
you’re measuring and how do you define the market, 
because that’s going to govern the prima facie case as 
to what, the merchant side or transaction platform?  
Depending on the answer to that question, you head 
down two different paths, and the analysis looks a 
little different.  You might get to the same outcome, 
but the way you get there is clearly different. 
MR. EVANS:  I don’t think we want to 
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MR. NIGRO:  Especially since I didn’t 
litigate it.  [Laughter] 
MR. EVANS:  And we can anticipate — anyway, 
I won’t say that. 
I was going to say, Mike, one point that I 
was going to ask you about.  You would agree that any 
decision that raises the demand for economists is 
obviously a good decision, correct? 
MR. CRAGG:  I’m the progeny of an economist, 
so I don’t know if my children will be economists, but 
yes, I think in general from a self-interest 
perspective, more demand for economists is good. 
MR. EVANS:  It seems social welfare 
maximizing to me. 
To pick up on Barry’s point, I think the 
issue going forward given the AMEX decision is how you 
go about defining markets, and that’s going to be the 
usual fact-intensive inquiry, which is going to be 
some combination of business documents and econometric 
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I don’t know what Ken put in in NCAA, but I 
would expect that typically in these cases you’re 
going to find that there is an awful lot of 
interesting detail in how businesses operate, in terms 
of how they take the demand from each side into 
account in running their businesses and setting prices 
and so forth, that is going to be instructive on the 
extent to which it’s a two-sided platform. 
In some cases there are going to be 
opportunities for sophisticated econometric studies on 
indirect network effects, basically studies on demand 
and the relationship between the two sides, and we’ll 
have economists doing those kinds of studies. 
I see this area as, like every other area 
that antitrust economists get involved in., it’s going 
to be data-intensive.  It’s going to require some 
economic analysis, but it’s not inherently any more 
complicated than lots of other stuff that we do all 
the time. 
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employment not totally tongue-in-cheek — make 
litigation much more complex and difficult.  As soon 
as someone says as a defense, “I’ve got a two-sided 
market,” you’ve got to litigate that now.  That’s not 
a motion to dismiss.  That then requires discovery, 
you’re going to go through summary judgment, etc.  I’m 
not even sure a jury can take in all that kind of 
complex economic information. 
MR. EVANS:  I really disagree with that.  
First of all, it’s not obvious to me why it’s not a 
motion to dismiss.  But, second of all, there’s this 
flavor — and it came in some of the amicus briefs in 
the AMEX case — that this is somehow really 
complicated, a lot of disagreement, and lots of things 
can be two-sided markets, and so forth. 
But in the economic literature there’s not a 
lot of disagreement.  You look at the literature from 
2001 to the present, there is a lot of agreement on 
what are two-sided platforms; there is a lot of 
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may be marginal cases, and there may be debates about 
that, but I think if someone walked in and said: “I’m 
a restaurant; I’m a two-sided market” or “I’m a retail 
store; I’m a two-sided market,” why is that not a 
motion to dismiss because there is no evidence to 
support that? 
MR. PAK:  I think as a plaintiff you would 
say, you look at the AMEX decision, I’ve made the 
factual allegations that this is a two-sided market, 
and I’ll make allegations about small but significant 
nontransitory increase in prices (SSNIP), etc.  You 
can’t dismiss me because the Supreme Court says you 
need all this kind of data and the analysis, and I 
need to know what’s going to happen on the supply 
side, on the consumer side, etc. 
MR. EVANS:  The AMEX decision is firmly 
grounded at the beginning of the decision in the 
economic literature on two-sided platforms, which more 
or less follows the definition that Barry gave: It’s 
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indirect network effects; pricing is important. 
Sure, if someone can show that those 
features are important for the business, then I guess 
I agree with you.  But it seems to me that there is a 
whole class of businesses where those features are not 
obvious at all and you’d have trouble getting 
respectable economists at least to come in and argue 
that it’s a two-sided platform.  I mean, I suppose you 
could always find someone to do it.  As I said, 
there’s not a ton of disagreement. 
MR. PAK:  I agree with that.  You can always 
find someone on the economic side to say —  
MR. NIGRO:  What David is saying is there 
are a lot of cases where there’s not going to be much 
for him to do. 
MR. EVANS:  I think that’s right. 
MR. NIGRO:  I tend to agree with Chul, 
though, that the question has built into it that it’s 
going to depend on the facts, and as long as facts are 
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about the commercial realities, that’s a fact question 
— I think it will tend to be the type of thing that 
will be hard to get rid of on a motion to dismiss.  
But in the NCAA case it was a motion for summary 
judgment where the judge tossed it. 
MR. CRAGG:  If I can provide a couple of 
comments as well.   
In terms of whether a jury can comprehend 
this or not, I spent the better part of two months in 
the Sabre trial working for US Airways.  One of the 
unique features of that trial was that at the end of 
every witness the judge gave the opportunity for the 
jurors to write down questions and then she selected 
from those questions which ones to have the witness 
address. 
What was interesting was that as the trial 
went on — and I would say right from the very 
beginning — the jury I thought exhibited a high degree 
of sophistication in the types of questions that they 
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perspective that it was going to be challenging for a 
jury, but I think on the whole most people who were 
there were surprised at the degree of sophistication 
that the jury was able to bring to the questions that 
they asked.  I think that speaks well as to whether or 
not these are comprehensible issues or not. 
The other observation I would make is that 
this term, “indirect network effects,” the question is 
— this is a question for lawyers — is that now a legal 
term in that it then allows the lawyers to present 
facts which relate to what they’ll label as indirect 
network effects; or do you need an economist to 
actually be able to look at the documents, look at the 
factual evidence, and be able to say, “Oh, that’s a 
network effect and that’s not a network effect”?  How 
would the proof go, do you think, as we move forward 
from these cases? 
MR. PAK:  It’s interesting when you read 
Justice Breyer’s dissent.  He said, “I looked around 
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legal cases and I couldn’t find it.”  I think he might 
have even included two-sided markets, but I can’t 
recall that one.  But I do remember him saying, “Jeez, 
I don’t know what indirect network effects look like.” 
It seems to me, now that the decision has 
come out and that is an element of the proof, if you 
have a two-sided platform and you want to fit your 
case into that, you’re going to have to now litigate 
this, and it is going to be defined by the courts, and 
it is going to be data-driven, it’s going to be price-
driven, and you’re going to have to put together a lot 
of economic evidence as well as anecdotal, customer-
type evidence to show that what happens to me as the 
platform on the supply side or the merchant side, for 
example in the AMEX case, is going to depend in part 
upon what happens to me on the consumer-facing side 
and vice versa, and there is not going to be that 
symbiotic type relationship. 
It can be in the form of, like in the AMEX 
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happens in competition and how do I hold on to my 
consumers, etc. 
MR. CRAGG:  Is it possible to try a case 
like this without an economist? 
MR. PAK:  Getting back to that notion, to me 
what the risk is — I appreciate very much the fact 
that there are very sophisticated jurors and quite 
often they can be very enthusiastic.  But if you’re 
representing a company and that company’s business 
model is based upon a platform and you’re now going to 
throw the legitimacy of that platform in front of a 
jury, that to me seems like a huge risk, and many 
general counsels and executives wouldn’t stomach that 
and would say, “I’m going to settle.” 
That’s my point about the litigation risk 
associated with these kinds of issues.  It’s a new 
layer of risk.  You may never get to the trial level. 
MR. CRAGG:  One of the amicus briefs that 
were provided to the Court which was signed on by a 
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worry about what the impact of AMEX could potentially 
be in the future if it was decided broadly, namely 
that is was essentially a “Get Out of Jail Free” card 
for defendants.  Namely, any defendant could argue 
that their business is a two-sided business, and 
therefore it raises the burden of proof on the 
plaintiffs if they haven’t dismissed the idea from the 
outset that it’s not a two-sided market. 
I was wondering if you could comment on 
that, and whether you see this being a broad decision 
or a narrow decision, and how it might play out in the 
future. 
MR. EVANS:  I can take a crack at that.  
First of all, I’m currently working on 
complainant cases involving two-sided platforms, so I 
sure hope that it doesn’t kill that side.  I don’t 
think it will. 
There’s no basis in economics, I don’t 
think, for the belief that somehow by recognizing the 
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going to lead to a bias on the plaintiff’s or the 
defendant’s side. 
One of the arguments that Dick Schmalensee 
and I made in the amicus brief that we presented to 
the Supreme Court is that if you do a single-sided 
analysis you run the risk of both false negatives and 
false positives.  It’s easy to see why that’s the 
case, because an important feature of two-sided 
platforms is benefits and costs, which are 
interdependent, that arise on both sides.  Depending 
upon where you do the accounting, if you focused on 
one side, you could end up doing a calculation that 
showed net harm; or you could do a calculation that 
showed net benefits and come up with an opposite 
calculation if you do it at the platform level. 
The easiest way to see this is to think 
about predatory pricing cases.  Predatory pricing 
cases, if you take a one-sided approach, given that we 
know that a lot of these platforms price below 
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behavior, you clearly run into a false positive if you 
treated it on a one-sided basis. 
A good example of that is in France.  There 
is a case involving Google Maps, where a lower court 
found predatory pricing because Google Maps was free, 
and the Paris Appeals Court, doing a full-blown 
overall analysis, rejected that conclusion. 
But think about it on the other side.  One 
way in a predatory pricing matter that you could 
engage in predation is — let’s suppose that we all 
agree that all competitors charge a price that is 
subsidized, free, or below marginal costs on one side.  
So I, dominant firm, in order to prey, reduce the 
above-marginal-cost price on the other side so that 
it’s still above marginal cost but lower, and the 
effect of that is to basically make it unprofitable 
for my competitors to compete.  If you don’t do the 
full analysis, you’re not going to discover that. 
I think it’s generally true that the errors 
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don’t see as a matter of economics why there is this 
belief that somehow this is a defense decision.  You 
take business realities into account, and by doing 
that you hopefully come up with the right answer. 
MR. PAK:  As to whether or not you read it 
narrowly or broadly, it’s going to vary, I think, with 
each court.  One reason you might read it narrowly is 
simply because of the way they define the market as a 
transaction market.  But I would argue that the 
underlying rationale of the case has broad 
implications for multiple types of technologies and 
platforms. 
The beauty of the case, or what I would call 
the benefit of the case, is the very fact that it 
recognizes cross-platform inefficiencies that arise 
out of these types of platforms on the consumer side 
as well as on the supply side.  The very fact that it 
recognizes network effects and the benefits of 
indirect network effects is a huge leap forward in the 
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MR. NIGRO:  At the Department we’re still 
studying the decision.  I agree with Chul that the 
principles on which it’s based are not necessarily 
limited to credit card transaction platforms or 
transaction platforms per se. 
On the other hand, I don’t think any time 
you have a so-called “two-sided” platform that you 
automatically as a defendant win the case.  The Court 
made clear that if the interdependence is weak or 
minor, that is not necessarily enough. 
I think in the end you’re really trying to 
understand the competitive dynamics, and is the 
interdependence such that one side of the platform is 
going to constrain the price on the other side.  The 
Court says that in Footnote 1.  It makes that point. 
Again, we’re still thinking about how to 
interpret the decision and apply it.  But I would 
think if the answer to that question is no, the hill 
could be steep for arguing that because it’s a two-
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On the other hand, if the answer is yes, 
then it seems that that’s something that should be 
taken into account at some level and shouldn’t be 
excluded because otherwise you’re only looking at half 
the picture.  Our job as enforcers is to really try 
our best to get it right to the extent that we can and 
looking at the competitive dynamics and the commercial 
realities as best we can. 
If the economics and contemporaneous 
business documents and testimony all point in the 
direction that, yes, the business is really focused on 
the pricing balance between the two sides and that’s 
what’s driving its behavior, then maybe it is a 
transaction platform or has the same characteristics 
and should be looked at as a whole. 
On the other hand, if that’s not what the 
evidence shows — I don’t think that every platform 
automatically is a so-called “two-sided market” that 
benefits from AMEX — I think it’s a fact question and 
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case. 
MR. EVANS:  I agree with that.  I think the 
AMEX decision is also a good example of not falling 
into the trap that once you define it as a two-sided 
market the defendant automatically wins. 
In AMEX there’s nothing in principle that 
says that given those allegations the result of the 
anti-steering provisions was in fact to increase the 
transaction price and to reduce the output below the 
competitive level.  There could be a set of facts that 
would support that, and in fact I believe DOJ would 
argue that it presented that set of facts to the 
district court and should have won on a two-sided 
market analysis.  In principle, there’s no reason in 
that kind of case that just because it’s a transaction 
platform why it wouldn’t be possible to show 
anticompetitive effects. 
MR. CRAGG:  I think it’s very helpful that 
you guys are emphasizing that the case is about a 
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transaction.  The Court it seemed actually tried to 
distinguish American Express from Visa and Mastercard 
by recognizing that not only do they provide 
transactions but they also provide consumer credit, so 
that’s potentially a different dimension of the 
product. 
What seems to be missing from the decision 
is guidance on how do you deal with product definition 
when you don’t have a transaction platform.  I’m 
curious if you could provide some insight into how 
that might be resolved in the future given the lack of 
guidance, at least in my reading of the decision.  You 
might correct me in my reading. 
Barry, do you want to take a stab at that? 
MR. NIGRO:  I think that’s a hard question.  
I’m not sure that I know the answer.  That was, as I 
said earlier, one of the critical differences between 
how the Department approached the question in this 
case and how the Supreme Court approached it. 
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merchant fees and said there was direct evidence of 
anticompetitive effects, no need to define a market or 
look at market power.   
The Supreme Court said, “Well, in order to 
figure out whether there’s direct evidence of an 
anticompetitive effect, we need to ask ‘In what?’” and 
so we do have to define a market, not for purposes of 
defining market power but to figure out whether there 
was an effect in that market. 
That to me is the critical question because 
if it’s the platform, you may have one set of 
competitors, and if it’s one side of the market at 
least to start, you would have another set of 
competitors.  I don’t know that there’s a simple 
answer to that question. 
MR. CRAGG:  Chul or David, do you want to 
provide us some perspective on what do you do if we’re 
not talking about the product definition being a 
transaction? 
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in your question. 
Just starting with transaction platforms and 
credit cards, I thought before you moved off from 
transaction platforms you were raising the question 
that even within the context of transaction platforms 
it’s complicated because there are different products 
and services that are in a narrow sense being provided 
to different customers, in the case of some credit and 
different things being provided to customers, and how 
do we deal with that? 
I don’t think that’s a unique problem with 
two-sided platforms because a lot of times we deal in 
cases where there’s bundling and consumers are getting 
different variants of products and so forth, and they 
need to be sorted out and we need to come up with 
price indices and aggregate them in some way.  But it 
does raise complexities even in that case. 
Then I think the next question is, when we 
say “nontransaction” platforms, well, what is that?  
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the decision, the term “transaction platform” comes 
from a paper by Filistrucci, Geradin, Van Damme, and 
Affeldt, and they basically make a distinction between 
transaction platforms and what Chul was talking about, 
ad-supported platforms.  That’s really the distinction 
that’s being made, transaction platforms on one side 
and then ad-supported platforms on the other side. 
Then you have other complexities that need 
to be dealt with, including how you sort that out from 
the statement in the decision on Times-Picayune and so 
forth.  That’s a whole other set of issues. 
MR. PAK:  This entire market definition 
issue, as Barry says — and I agree with David — is 
incredibly complex, and I don’t think I know the 
answer either. 
I find one, a bit of a tangent.  One issue 
that came up in the case that I found fascinating 
because you don’t see it laid out in the Supreme Court 
quite often is raised by the dissent, which is this 
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whatever the relevant market is, we shouldn’t even be 
asking that question because we’ve got evidence that 
the district court found of direct anticompetitive 
effects on multiple fronts. 
The Supreme Court, because it was the 
minority decision, didn’t come out and say, “We don’t 
need definitions of relevant markets,” but that 
typically — and as Barry knows from the DOJ litigation 
— there were both substantive as well as strategic 
reasons as to why you don’t want to get bolloxed down 
into what is the relevant market. 
I think the case here and the question 
addressed here raises that very fundamental issue: If 
you believe you’ve got evidence of direct 
anticompetitive effects, but the case law always says, 
“Well, I need to know what’s the relevant market?” and 
then you start tackling that issue, you sometimes can 
lose the big picture of “Don’t we see harm?”  But now 
we have to come up with a market and how we’re going 
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issue and not see the ultimate harm effect. 
I suspect part of the DOJ’s strategy is to 
avoid that analysis. 
MR. NIGRO:  So the case argued direct 
effects and also indirect through market power.  
Eventually, on appeal the indirect argument was 
dropped, and the case by the time it got to the 
Supreme Court was left based on the direct effects. 
MR. CRAGG:  I guess the issue seems to be 
whether you agree whether there are direct effects or 
not, right?  Ultimately, that’s the chief issue that 
was tackled by the Court, to say that unless you take 
account of both sides of this market you can’t 
determine whether high prices on one side is 
sufficient evidence to determine that there are direct 
effects. 
MR. EVANS:  That’s the fundamental policy 
issue for this area, which is, when you have two-sided 
platforms and you have two groups of customers that 
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standpoint to treat them separately and allow the 
possibility that harm to one group of customers is 
counterbalanced by benefits to the other group of 
customers? 
That’s the fundamental policy issue, and the 
Supreme Court came down on the side of, “Well, if 
they’re interrelated and you have this kind of funny 
pricing structure going on where harm here may mean 
benefits here, you need to take them both into 
account.”  To me that seems like a sensible thing to 
do, but that’s a policy judgment.  It seems to make 
sense. 
MR. PAK:  When you look at the decision 
itself, I thought the dissent and the majority 
sometimes talked past each other on the facts.  I 
didn’t deal with the underlying facts well enough to 
know what was true and not true, but to David’s point 
of trying to balance basically the majority was saying 
that on the merchant fee side, yes, the merchant fees 
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reinvested in higher rewards for consumers, and those 
consumers then stayed loyal to American Express, 
brought more high-margin business to retailers, and 
that net was a balance.  Consumer welfare I think was 
equal, whereas the dissent said, No, there wasn’t a 
net-net-zero.  In fact, the higher merchant fees 
didn’t translate into dollar-for-dollar greater 
rewards and whatnot. 
I couldn’t tell from the decision as to 
whether or not it was —  
MR. EVANS:  So there’s a debate over this.  
Let’s suppose that we agree that the facts showed that 
merchants were harmed and consumers benefited.  There 
are arguments in AMEX as to why that wasn’t the case, 
but let’s assume we have a platform case where the 
exclusionary behavior is on the merchant side 
allegedly, and the effect of that exclusionary 
behavior is not only to benefit the consumers — people 
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It is hard to imagine for me any policy 
reason why in that kind of situation you wouldn’t want 
to take the benefits to consumers, to people, into 
account.  I can see from a policy standpoint that one 
could argue the reverse because merchants are people, 
but I don’t understand how one could argue that when 
consumers are harmed on net why one as a policy matter 
wouldn’t want to take that into account. 
MR. PAK:  I agree with you entirely.  I was 
talking about the factual distinction in the case that 
made me think I’m not quite sure exactly which way it 
was ultimately coming out.  But clearly if the 
merchant fees or the higher cost on that side is being 
redirected to the benefit of the consumer side, net-
net on balance equal, I agree with you. 
Quite often technology platforms are created 
in that fashion.  I don’t know necessarily the cost, 
but the network effect component is how products get 
created in technology platforms in the first place, 
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innovation and the new kinds of products that are out 
there, the new kinds of platforms, without giving 
credit to the fact that what is happening is 
beneficial to consumers as well as the suppliers. 
MR. NIGRO:  I think we have to be careful 
because I hear people talking about anticompetitive 
conduct on one side or price increases on one side 
benefitting another side.  I think it’s important that 
those sides are related, maybe even closely related 
and interdependent. 
Surely you couldn’t justify an 
anticompetitive price increase in order to provide an 
unrelated good, let’s say heart surgery to poor 
people.  Otherwise, you could justify all kinds of 
price fixing and everything. 
They have to be related in some way, and the 
Court talked about the simultaneous nature of the 
transactions, so that’s probably the most closely 
related interdependent market you can get.  That seems 
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distinguished that from the newspaper advertising 
example where the interdependence was weak because the 
indirect network effects flowed in one direction. 
Then there is this whole gap between those 
two extremes, and the question is where you draw the 
line.  I think that’s the hard question. 
MR. CRAGG:  I think that’s another dimension 
of the decision which is important to recognize, is 
the notion of simultaneity and that in many instances 
you’ll have a platform where the activities aren’t 
happening simultaneously. 
You take a gaming system, for instance, 
where you’ll have game developers on one hand 
producing for the platform, and then the game may or 
may not take off and grow, and consumers on the other 
side of the platform to utilize the game.  It doesn’t 
seem like the decision gives us much guidance on how 
to think about that. 
Another dimension that the platform decision 
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Barry, you were noting, and that, Chul, you were 
noting, a lot of the pricing behavior that economists 
are interested in is around pricing that allows you to 
grow the platform.  There is an assumption in the 
literature that growing the platform and balancing the 
prices on both sides of the platform in order to grow 
it most rapidly to the largest size possible is what’s 
driving the behavior. 
Ultimately, as the platform grows, one of 
the ultimate issues is that the network effects become 
a barrier to entry.  I’m curious how you guys think or 
whether there will be cases that differentiate between 
relatively new platforms versus older, established 
platforms, and how you might think about that. 
MR. EVANS:  I disagree with the premise.  
The economic literature doesn’t have a theory that 
says this is all about growing platforms.  The main 
body of economic theory is an equilibrium theory where 
in long-run equilibrium these pricing structures 
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It’s not simply an artifact of starting a platform and 
growing a platform. 
The way to see this practically is if you 
just look at a lot of platforms that are very old — 
shopping malls are half a century old, shoppers get in 
for free, stores pay; ad-supported media, typically 
the reader’s side gets subsidized., newspapers are 
generally not really sold at above marginal cost, and 
advertisers pay; credit cards have had rewards for a 
long time.  The pricing structure, this kind of 
balancing where one side gets a deal and the other 
side pays a premium, both in theory and in fact that 
is a long-run attribute of platform businesses.  
That’s the premise that I don’t agree with. 
MR. CRAGG:  In theory the guiding principle 
is what happens at the margin.  In thinking about what 
the network effects are then for a platform that is 
being newly formed versus one that is well-
established, presumably the network effects that 
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those contrasting platforms. 
MR. EVANS:  Yes, but if we’re going to 
characterize businesses based on business realities, 
we have businesses that obviously have significant 
indirect network effects, even if those network 
effects happen to diminish with quantity.  So we have 
a set of businesses that are characterized by 
significant indirect network effects, from telecoms to 
big online platforms to shopping malls and so forth, 
but they still have indirect network effects, and they 
are still platforms, and they’re characterized as the 
business model and they’re characterized as the 
pricing relationship. 
I can’t see what the economic theory would 
be that says that we — maybe the analysis of pricing 
effects and so forth will vary depending upon the 
degree of indirect network effects and the stage and 
so forth, but in terms of whether something should be 
characterized as a two-sided platform I don’t think 
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teenager-but-I-get-over-it-when-I’m-an-adult kind of 
thing going on. 
MR. PAK:  My son hasn’t gotten over it.  
He’s still a teenager, it seems to me. 
MR. EVANS:  But by the time he’s fifty —  
MR. PAK:  Right. 
MR. NIGRO:  He takes your money and spends 
it.  So it’s a one-sided platform. 
MR. CRAGG:  I think what I’m trying to get 
at is that the nature of the competitive outcome for 
what prices will look like as a theoretical 
proposition will change as the size of the platform 
population changes. 
MR. EVANS:  But they don’t.  Maybe in some 
cases they do, but if you look by and large at two-
sided platform businesses over their trajectory — and 
maybe there’s path dependence here — it’s not like 
platforms start with one pricing structure and then 
they evolve into another pricing structure. 
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subsidized to the user since they were born in 1950; 
open cable has had the same model of charging 
restaurants a buck a seat and making it free to the 
user since it was started in 1998; shopping malls have 
always been free to the shopper and charged to the 
retailer.  You can go down the list. 
MR. CRAGG:  I don’t think that’s —  
MR. EVANS:  You’re making a different point 
or —  
MR. CRAGG:  No, no.  That open cable, for 
instance, has changed its pricing policies to both 
sides of the platform over time. 
MR. EVANS:  Not much. 
MR. CRAGG:  No, no.  The point is that it is 
changing it. 
MR. EVANS:  How is it changing it? 
MR. CRAGG:  The charge to the restaurant has 
changed over time. 
MR. EVANS:  No, it hasn’t. 
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the consumer for multiple bookings has changed. 
MR. EVANS:  But basically open cable is free 
to the user.  There has been some introduction of 
rewards over time, and there are fees for —  
MR. CRAGG:  No, but I think you’re missing 
the point entirely, which is the structure may stay 
the same. 
MR. EVANS:  I often do. 
MR. CRAGG:  The structure may stay the same 
where you have a benefit conferred to one side and a 
cost to another, but the relative mix of those 
benefits and costs do change over time. 
MR. NIGRO:  Think of it this way.  If there 
are network effects, you’re saying the network becomes 
more valuable as more users plug in, right? 
MR. EVANS:  Yes. 
MR. NIGRO:  So how is that value captured?  
I guess you’re asking can maybe this relationship, the 
interdependence exists, but the way you capture that 
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MR. CRAGG:  The question for the platform 
owner is —  
MR. NIGRO:  Is that what you’re asking if I 
understand the question? 
MR. CRAGG:  The question for the platform 
owner is, at the margin what do I need to pay either 
side of the platform to attract additional consumers?  
That’s the balancing that matters. 
MR. EVANS:  I’m still not sure I understand 
the point.  Maybe the details of pricing change a bit, 
but the inherent pricing structure sometimes changes.  
Magazines in the United States used to be completely 
subscription-supported and then they became ad-
supported, so there are flips like that that happen.  
But by and large empirically I’m hard-pressed to see 
very many examples of platforms that have had 
fundamental changes in pricing structures.  I suppose 
it could happen.  I just don’t know many examples. 
MR. CRAGG:  The issue wouldn’t be 
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price changes, and that I think speaks to whether 
there’s market power that would be of interest to 
either a regulator or someone who is affected by that.  
That’s the only point. 
MR. PAK:  But doesn’t it depend upon the 
nature of the competition?  In other words, size alone 
doesn’t give you market power.  I’ve heard people say 
that it’s not so much the quantity of data that you 
have but how well do you utilize that data, and then 
able to translate that into something that a buyer 
might be able to utilize that generates money for you. 
It seems to me that in this day and age 
looking at it the people who are able to utilize that 
data and transform it into something that they can 
sell is getting much more sophisticated and better and 
better.  Therefore, it seems to me the nature of the 
competitors changes, and doesn’t that bring down the 
price ultimately as opposed to your internal change in 
business model, whether incremental or whatnot? 
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product that you’re considering is going to matter 
here.  You’re emphasizing the quantity of data, for 
instance, on an ad-based system or a retailing-type 
system.  Do you make better use of it as opposed to 
just the pure quantity of it? 
MR. PAK:  Exactly. 
MR. CRAGG:  For sure. 
We’ve identified so far some of the critical 
aspects of the decision as it regards what is two-
sidedness and product definition. 
One of the questions now is: Assume that for 
the moment there is market power, that in some way the 
defendant has been shown to have an ability to 
exercise market power in its decisions about how to 
price its product.  What kinds of practices in a 
platform are things that either regulators or those 
who are being exposed to the platform in some way need 
to be worried about? 
MR. PAK:  The AMEX one is a good example of 
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courts and regulators have often focused on business 
practices that tell the entities that that business is 
dealing with, “You can’t do something with another 
rival.”  That seems to always be the linchpin; that’s 
a no-no. 
Whereas if you focus more on what you and 
your suppliers or customers can do without referencing 
rivals, it’s a nuance, but that seems to me — looking 
at regulators and how they think about things — that’s 
more permissible than when you say, “You can’t do 
something with my rival.” 
MR. EVANS:  Let’s suppose that in the early 
1960s American Express, which was then the dominant 
credit card platform, had a policy where it told 
merchants that they could only exclusively accept 
American Express cards, or they had some kind of 
extreme most-favored nation (MFN) provision that made 
it difficult for other credit card companies to come 
in and recruit merchants?  That kind of practice would 
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merchants and would have made it very difficult for 
them to get the critical mass of merchants necessary 
to attract consumers. 
Generally, practices on the part of 
platforms may very well have procompetitive effects, 
but the thing to worry about is practices that prevent 
rivals from either acquiring or keeping the critical 
mass that’s necessary for these indirect network 
effects that we’ve talked about.  I would worry about 
those. 
MR. CRAGG:  Yes.  Is it then less of an 
issue when there are rivals that are well-established, 
or does that not matter? 
There are two circumstances you can imagine: 
One is an entrant trying to come in and establish 
itself, and the other would be that you have, as in 
the credit card case, several different platforms that 
are competing with each other. 
MR. NIGRO:  I would tend to go back to 
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restrictions and negative restrictions.  This is an 
oversimplification, but if you think about exclusive 
dealing arrangements, a positive restriction that 
encourages investment is easier to justify and defend 
than a negative restriction that says don’t do 
something.  That’s not to say that you can’t have 
negative restrictions that are procompetitive or 
positive restrictions that are anticompetitive. 
I think the question is whether the 
restriction that you’re talking about forecloses entry 
or makes entry more difficult.  Obviously, if there 
are more competitors in the market and the market 
share of the firm that’s engaging in that conduct, 
that’s all going to be relevant to the competitive 
dynamics, but if it’s a restrictive practice that is 
making entry more difficult and there isn’t any 
offsetting procompetitive justification, it’s hard to 
see how that would be lawful. 
MR. CRAGG:  Just to wrap things up, speaking 
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that if given the bipartisan group of attorneys 
general who fought the American Express case, do you 
see states that are potentially going to seek changes 
in their state antitrust statutes which will limit the 
impact of the AMEX decision? 
MR. PAK:  It certainly wouldn’t surprise me 
if that did happen because what the AMEX decision is 
talking about is the impact upon merchants, and 
merchants are typically local business. 
We saw in the Leegin case and resale price 
maintenance legislation and actions taken by the state 
AGs following Leegin there is I think a nascent or 
maybe established political economic desire to protect 
merchants at the local level, so it would not surprise 
me if state AGs and legislators look for ways to 
undercut the AMEX decision because it does I think 
make it more difficult to bring a case against large 
platforms. 
MR. NIGRO:  I think it’s hard to predict 
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uniform set of rules that businesses can adhere to.  
If there is divergence, I think it would be 
unfortunate.  It would create opportunities for forum 
shopping and create confusion for the business 
community.  But who knows?  It has happened before. 
MR. EVANS:  I think the worst thing that 
happened to the area of two-sided platforms when it 
comes to antitrust is that so many of the cases have 
involved credit cards because it has turned into 
basically a referendum on what you think about cards.  
I think the reaction to AMEX is from this almost 
bipartisan distaste for cards. 
MR. CRAGG:  The other aspect of the decision 
is that the United States as a result of this decision 
is adopting a new concept, namely that having the 
potential for the economics of a two-sided market 
being important for the analysis of competition 
policy.  That’s a relatively unique position in the 
world now.  How do you imagine this getting reconciled 
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that I mischaracterized where we are and that in fact 
other parts of the world have implicitly adopted the 
two-sided economic view, now legal view, just with a 
different language. 
MR. EVANS:  There are different approaches 
that have been taken.  The United States has taken the 
approach of really diving into the market definition 
question.  In Europe, the European Court of Justice in 
Cartes Bancaires, which is an Article 101 case, took a 
different approach than the Justice Department 
recommended.  It’s still two separate markets, but 
then in terms of evaluating competitive effects they 
combine the two markets together in order to net out 
the competitive effect.  So that’s two separate 
markets but combined for the purposes of establishing 
competitive effects. 
China, not quite as developed, but really 
looking at the two-sided things after doing separate 
market definition but then taking into account in the 
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The general two-sided framework is 
resonating around the world.  I think the divergence 
is really the extent to which you define a single-
sided market versus a two-sided one as opposed to 
whether you need to take both into account. 
MR. CRAGG:  Let me give you each one last 
assignment, and then we’ll open things up to 
questions, if there are any.   
Could you give your primary takeaway as to 
what the audience members here should focus on as they 
think about learning from this precedent? 
MR. NIGRO:  As I said earlier, I think the 
critical part of the opinion has to do with the 
strength of the interdependence and whether the 
“commercial realities,” to use the Court’s term, are 
such that the firm is taking into account both sides 
of the market when it sets price in the broad sense.  
The Court indicated that in Footnote 1. 
Obviously, the big question is, what market 
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Even where you have direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects — at last under AMEX as I read it — you need 
to ask in what market.  I think the whole case comes 
down to Pages 10, 11, and 12, and Footnote 7.  If 
that’s all you read, that’s the meat of it. 
It talks about the relevant market 
definition, the interdependence, and where the 
exceptions are.  I think a lot of us will be spending 
the next few years trying to figure out where to draw 
the line between the newspaper advertising market 
example and the transactional platform where you have 
simultaneous activity on both sides between different 
user groups and the interdependence is most 
pronounced. 
MR. EVANS:  The weather is beautiful out 
there.  We’re going to have some more warm weather.  I 
recommend that you all go to the beach, get a copy of 
my book, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided 
Platforms, and lie there, perhaps with the AMEX 
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read that. 
MR. PAK:  I second that.   
To answer that specific question, though, 
when you look at the market-definition component of 
these two-sided platforms, that’s to me very 
technical, and whether you can squeeze your case into 
that or get your case out of that, that’s very fact-
specific to me and data-driven. 
I think what’s more lasting about the case 
is the fact of the recognition of the benefits of two-
sided platforms.  In particular, I disagree with 
Barry.  I’d say the last page of the majority decision 
is basically the most important because to me the AMEX 
decision is another way of looking at vertical 
relationships and interdependence and interbrand 
competition. 
It’s basically saying if you are in a two-
sided platform kind of business, there are benefits 
that arise out of that business, and what you’re 






Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
that’s the kind of interbrand competition that we 
want, particularly in the technology sector. 
MR. CRAGG:  As the moderator I can choose to 
have the last word, which I’ll take that option. 
In terms of the most important advice that I 
would have for you, I thought David was very astute in 
telling the audience, “Don’t use the term ‘two-sided’ 
as a way of instructing yourself on what is going on 
here,” that the number-one thing to be thinking about 
is: Are there feedbacks that create a need for 
differentiating the product and market at issue from 
traditional vertical relationships? 
MR. NIGRO:  I can’t believe we made it this 
long without using the word “feedback.” 
MR. CRAGG:  That to me is the piece that if 
you keep your eye on that ball then you won’t be led 
astray. 
Our time is up, right? 
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QUESTION [Pinar Bagci, The Brattle Group]:  
A couple of comments and a question.  In one of the 
comments, Mike, you mentioned about platforms reaching 
a sort of tipping point, and David, you said you 
didn’t think that it was entirely relevant. 
In the European context at least, regulators 
have been receptive to ideas about platforms reaching 
a minimum scale, and they’ve been receptive to ideas 
about a pricing structure for a limited period of time 
until a platform reaches a critical mass.  Do you have 
a view on that? 
MR. CRAGG:  I think you actually 
characterized — the difference between the two of us 
is a little different, but I think it’s a good 
question nonetheless. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Bagci]:  Maybe I’ll just 
continue for a bit.  For example, like the SEPA direct 
debit schemes in Europe which have been approved for 
an interchange for a limited period of time until the 
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of a comment than a question. 
The other thing is about the pricing 
structure once platforms reach a critical mass.  I can 
think of two.  Facebook never had ads, and now 
Facebook has ads, which changes the consumer 
experience.  From a consumer benefit perspective, my 
benefit has gone down.  Perhaps I’m not paying 
anymore, but I have to look at ads. 
I was thinking YouTube is the same thing.  
Now there’s a subscription service, which means that 
the quality of the service that I got before has been 
changed.  Both of these changes seemed to occur from a 
consumer perspective when the platforms reached a 
certain size. 
MR. EVANS:  I disagree with you in the case 
of Facebook just factually.  Facebook had ads I think 
starting within the first year, not to a large degree, 
but they had ads on Facebook very early on.  I think 
if you go to the early histories of Facebook, Chris 
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this is as of early 2005. 
I think ads on Facebook have been there from 
the beginning.  Ads on YouTube were introduced I think 
after the acquisition by Google, but that’s two years 
into the history. 
But I’m not sure what the point is.  Yes, 
consumers may not like ads.  I’ll stipulate. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Bagci]:  The point was when 
platforms reach a critical size is there a change in 
the pricing structure?  I was trying to find evidence 
of that.  Because you were saying you didn’t think so, 
that you say the pricing structure doesn’t really —  
MR. EVANS:  I think YouTube is a good 
example of that, and Facebook is in the sense that the 
volume of ads on Facebook has increased over time, and 
YouTube adopted a no-ad policy as have some of these 
other platforms for some period of time until the 
platform got off the ground and had critical mass.  
There’s a change in the pricing structure in that way 
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structure. 
I’m not sure whether you were making a 
consumer welfare point as well. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Bagci]:  Diminished quality—  
MR. EVANS:  But wait a sec.  The thing about 
ad platforms —  
MR. NIGRO:  Isn’t this a commonsense thing, 
though?  When someone comes out with a new product, 
they are trying to get a bunch of eyeballs, so they 
just push it out there and make it as attractive as 
possible, and once they get all those eyeballs, then 
they’re like, “Okay, now I want to monetize this.”  I 
thought that’s how all these businesses worked. 
MR. EVANS:  A lot of them do.  For that kind 
of content business, consumers may not like ads, but 
they like content, and they get content because people 
are willing to pay for ads.  So there is a feedback 
effect between the advertiser side and the user side 
that’s intermediated to the content, but for those 
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example, that they can’t have as many ads and reduce 
the revenue stream, that has to have an impact on the 
content, which has to have an impact on the consumer 
value. 
MR. CRAGG:  James. 
QUESTION [James Keyte, Fordham]:  A broader 
question.  What does the decision say about nonprice 
vertical restraints where you define a market, two-
sided platform, so you have a market definition that 
gives the output is this transaction.  And then, 
essentially, you have what appears to be harm to 
rivals, maybe raising rivals’ costs, kind of per 
Chicago theory.  But the Court had a footnote that 
kind of suggests, “Hey, at the end of the day it’s a 
nonprice vertical restraint and the interbrand form of 
the rivals may not really matter if output is 
increasing those other transactions.  I just want to 
see if there was a reaction to that dicta in the case 
in terms of where the Court is headed on nonprice or 
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MR. PAK:  That’s what I was referencing.  At 
the end of the majority’s decision I thought it was 
very interesting, but it did frame it as interbrand 
competition in a vertical relationship, and I was 
thinking to myself, Well, I think the basic message is 
AMEX needs to do certain things to protect itself and 
compete vigorously against Visa and Mastercard.  To 
me, that did not seem terribly new or different in 
that regard. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Keyte]:  I guess, of course, 
did the raising rivals’ costs theories kind of take a 
hit because when they’re saying, “Look, output is the 
focus. So, if they’re harming each other while output 
is growing and they’re not a dominant player, there’s 
an implication that consumer welfare is not at risk. 
MR. PAK:  That was part of the analysis, 
that output seemed to have been growing throughout the 
entire time. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Keyte]:  Right. 
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really important to the Court there was the degree to 
which AMEX holders are multi-homing by holding Visa 
cards and Mastercards versus the other way around, 
where Visa and Mastercard holders aren’t all multi-
homing by holding AMEX.  They noted that there is a 
distinct difference in the degree of competition 
between those who are dealing with AMEX cards versus 
those who are dealing with the other credit cards. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Keyte]:  One more question. 
MR. CRAGG:  Dina had one. 
QUESTION [Dina Kallay, Ericsson]:  I think 
mine is a little similar to yours, but I’ll ask it 
anyway.  I’m not an expert in two-sided markets or 
anything.  I just read this story as an antitrust 
story.  You know that our comment is usually excluding 
our competitor, and they come complaining. 
To me that story is not here at all.  I 
assume the complainants are the merchants, and they 
think they’re paying too much for a contract that they 
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want — they don’t have to sign it.  I actually know 
that overseas most businesses do not accept 
Mastercard.  The merchants tell you to your face, we 
don’t accept them.  Give me another card. 
I worry that this is not an exclusion case 
but an exploitative abuses appearing and widening 
position case I don’t want, we read about in Asia and 
we don’t like.  What am I missing? 
MR. CRAGG:  That is a similar defense that 
was used in the Sabre case as well, that the airlines 
voluntarily signed a contract which included a similar 
set of restrictions.  The argument there from the 
plaintiffs, from the airlines, was that because the 
global distribution system had market power, they from 
a survival perspective had to sign the contract, and 
so whether they entered into it voluntarily or not was 
one of the core issues. 
MR. KEYTE:  All right. 
MR. CRAGG:  Thank you very much to the 
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last minute to replace their colleagues. 
MR. KEYTE:  Let’s take ten minutes. 
[Break: 3:14 p.m.] 
